George Osborne’s Permanent Bank Levy – Is it Seigniorage?
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Positive Money (PM) is not impressed by the Chancellors’ attempts to impose some kind of payback on the banks for the damage they have caused to the Economy since 2008. “In fact, bar a one-off punitive tax on bankers’ bonuses and a bank levy, little has changed” says a PM report ‘Banking vs Democracy 2012’. I’d like to make the case that while the Bank Levy, introduced in 2010 is indeed rather puny, it establishes a very important principle – that the banks should pay something for the money that they create.
The “Permanent Bank Levy” was introduced in George Osborne’s June 2010 Emergency Budget, having been negotiated as part of the Coalition Agreement. (Osborne has been in the habit of tacking ‘permanent’ on to the name, in part to distinguish it from Labour’s 2009 one-off levy on bankers’ bonuses). In his budget speech he declared the aim of the Bank Levy “is to incentivise a reduction in the use of wholesale finance by banks, with a view to reducing the risk of another financial crisis being triggered by liquidity issues”. The Bank Levy was to be “based on total liabilities and equity as shown in the relevant balance sheet” of the 30 or 40 biggest banks. The initial rate was set at 0.05% and was expected to raise “in excess of £2bn.”
But what possessed Osborne the Tory Chancellor to agree with his Coalition partners that a Bank Levy was the necessary and right thing to do? The short answer is that the IMF told them so. In a report (1) produced in 2010 for the G20 Summit of world leaders, the IMF rejected the widely publicised tax based on financial transactions — the so-called ‘Robin Hood’ tax. Instead they proposed that banks should pay a ‘Financial Stability Contribution’ (FSC).
“The main component of the FSC would be a levy to pay for the fiscal cost of any future government support to the sector. This could either accumulate in a fund to facilitate the resolution of weak institutions or be paid into general revenue. The FSC would be paid by all financial institutions, initially levied at a flat rate (varying though by type of financial institutions) but refined thereafter to reflect individual institutions’ riskiness and contributions to systemic risk—such as those related to size, interconnectedness and substitutability—and variations in overall risk over time.”
So the word ‘levy’ was introduced into the discourse by the IMF, not as a simple tax, but the basis for a fund to offset future risk. Clearly the size of the risk posed by each banking institution depends on the amount of funds at their disposal, but also the riskiness (or recklessness!) of the loans or investments they have made.
Osborne picked up on the IMF’s idea, not as the basis for a stabilisation fund but as a straightforward Tax. The balance sheet items of the 30 or 40 largest financial institutions were to be the basis for the levy. The least risky items on the balance sheets were to be exempt for tax. Tax at half the main would apply to moderately risky items, then the full Main Rate of the tax was to be levied on the rest. Thus the IMF’s ‘financial stability contribution’, became Osborne’s ‘permanent’ Bank Levy. Here’s how the Levy worked during the Coalition Government’s term of 2010-15:
TABLE 1: BANK LEVY YIELD, RATES AND IMPLIED TAXABLE CAPITAL
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The Bank Levy was introduced from 1 January 2011. Payments began to be received from 2011-12 onwards.
M3 is an economists’ measure of the total amount of money in the economy. Most of M3 (97%) is to be found on the balance sheets of the banking institutions, having been created electronically within the banks themselves. The remaining 3% is M0, tangible cash in the form of banknotes
*Implied Capital is the Bank Levy yield divided by the Main Rate. Only part of the large banks’ balance sheets is taxed at the Main Rate. Low-risk items are exempt, and medium risk items are taxed at one-half of the Main Rate.
~ The rate was initially proposed at 0.04%, finalised at 0.05%, then increased for the last two months of Fiscal 11/12 to 0.10%. Hence no calculation of Implied Capital was made for 11/12
# Proposed as the final rate, but in the June 2015 Emergency Budget lower rates were introduced.
So the Bank Levy has collected small but useful amounts from the larger financial institutions, but usually fell short of its target expected yield, and never reached the £3.6bn achieved by the previous government’s Bankers’ Bonus Tax. Nor was it a big part of the total amount paid in taxes – £21.7bn in 2012/13 – paid by the banks (2).
The rate of the Bank Levy tax was, as intended and signalled, gradually stepped up, but the rate has been changed, sometimes without warning — for example in March/April 2011when it was increased from 0.05% to 0.10% for two months. It was due to reach its final ultimate rate of 0.21% in 2015/16. But then in the emergency June 2015 Budget, Osborne gave in to the pleas of the big banks, especially HSBC and Standard Chartered. A timetable of reductions of Bank Levy from 0.21% was announced with the rate to settle down at 0.10% by January 2021.
Osborne’s permanent Bank Levy – it’s Seigniorage!
The Bank Levy is a brand new form of tax. Despite it being attacked by the greatest powers in the land, the big banks, it has survived. Just as importantly the operating procedures for the bank levy have been established, definitions have been thrashed out and agreed. This is a tax which works, and continues to be paid.
But the bank tax is also important because it embodies an important if unstated principle: that banks should pay back to society some kind of recompense based on the amount of money that that they create. The technical name for this is seigniorage. What the analysts at the IMF had pushed for and what Osborne’s Bank Levy represents is a straightforward example of seigniorage in action. It is far from a new idea, and a form of it already exists right here in the UK.
Seigniorage from the Bank of England (BoE): Profit from issuing banknotes.
Seigniorage may be an unfamiliar word, but a simple idea. In the old days when the sovereign (the king) issued new money, he benefitted thereby. This still happens when the Bank of England issues banknotes and coins. It does indeed reap a financial reward – seigniorage – which is paid over annually to Her Majesty’s Treasury. Here’s how it works:
New banknotes are being issued all the time by the Bank of England (BoE). In the period 2014-15, for example, an additional £3.6bn worth of banknotes were put into circulation by the BoE. So, was a cheque for £3.6bn handed over to HM Treasury by the Bank? No. A more mysterious method to calculate seigniorage is used, although the BoE doesn’t actually use the word. They prefer to call it “Profit on note-issue”.
In essence (3), to calculate the Profit on note-issue, the BoE uses the Total value of the banknotes circulating in the economy. This is what economists call M0. In 2015 banknotes with a face-value of £64bn were circulating in the UK economy. (There are banknotes issued by Scottish and Northern Ireland banks, too, but under BoE supervision. Part of the seigniorage is remitted to Scottish and Northern Ireland governments.)
The formula for ‘Profit on Issue of banknotes’ (Seigniorage) can be taken as:
Total Value of banknotes in circulation ‘M0’ multiplied by the Average Bank Rate during that year.
Here’s what the BoE has paid over to HM Treasury for the last 12 years. Although the total note-issue has nearly doubled in that time, the seigniorage or Profit on banknote Issue has shrivelled to less than a quarter of its peak in 2008. This reflects the BoE policy of rock-bottom interest rates since then.