Who decides who runs the ECB?

On the 10th March, the European Parliament approved Boris Vujcic as the next Vice-President of the European Central Bank (ECB) with 460 votes in favour, 68 against, and 91 abstentions. His appointment, which must still be confirmed by the European Council, marks the beginning of a major renewal period for the Board. 

Between May 2026 and July 2027, four of the six members of the ECB’s Executive Board (including President Christine Lagarde) will be replaced. These appointments matter: the Executive Board plays a central role in shaping monetary policy across the eurozone. 

Over the past years, crises from Covid-19 to the inflation spike following Russia’s war on Ukraine have pushed the ECB into the political spotlight. Despite this visibility, the process through which ECB leaders are selected remains largely opaque. Key negotiations take place behind closed doors, and the European Parliament has only a limited role. This blog opens that black box, looking at why the composition of the Executive Board matters, how its members are really chosen, and how the process could be made more transparent and accountable.

Why the Executive Board matters

The Executive Board is one of the ECB’s main decision-making bodies. It consists of six members: the President, the Vice-President, and four other board members. Together they represent the public face of the institution.

The Board participates in the ECB’s Governing Council alongside the governors of the eurozone’s national central banks. This body decides on interest rates and other monetary policy measures that are designed to control inflation and maintain financial stability. The Executive Board is also responsible for implementing these decisions and managing the ECB’s day-to-day operations.

The composition of the Board matters, monetary policy decisions are not only technical; rather, they are inevitably influenced by policymakers’ intellectual backgrounds, professional experiences, and policy preferences. These perspectives shape how they interpret economic risks, assess trade-offs, and prioritise policy objectives. The consequences are significant: ECB decisions affect the economic conditions faced by the roughly 358 million people living in the eurozone.

In principle, a decision-making body with such influence should reflect a broad range of experiences and perspectives. Diversity can improve policymaking by challenging dominant assumptions and reducing the risk of groupthink.

The ECB’s Executive Board, however, has historically lacked diversity. Since the ECB was established in 1998, only five women have served on the Board. Until now, no member has ever come from a Central or Eastern European member state, while the four largest eurozone economies — Germany, France, Italy, and Spain — have been consistently represented.

This lack of diversity extends beyond gender and nationality. It also concerns intellectual and professional backgrounds. Most Executive Board members studied economics at Western universities and built their careers within central banking or public financial institutions. As a result, their policy frameworks have often been shaped by similar economic ideas, typically rooted in mainstream approaches emphasising market efficiency and price stability. Issues such as inequality, climate change, and power imbalances in the economy have historically received far less attention within these frameworks.

This pattern is not accidental. It reflects political choices made by eurozone governments and EU policymakers. And those choices are largely negotiated out of public view.

A process shaped by closed-door politics

The formal procedure for appointing Executive Board members is outlined in Article 283 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. According to the treaty, members are appointed by the European Council by qualified majority — meaning that at least 15 of the 27 member states, representing more than 65 percent of the EU population, must support the decision.

The first stage takes place within the Eurogroup, where finance ministers propose and negotiate potential candidates. These discussions occur entirely behind closed doors. Despite the importance of the positions involved, the negotiations receive little public attention and almost no transparency.

The formal eligibility criteria are minimal: candidates must be EU nationals with “recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters.” Beyond that, little information is available about how candidates are evaluated.

Informal political rules also play a role. One longstanding convention is that the eurozone’s four largest countries — Germany, France, Italy, and Spain — should always hold seats on the Executive Board. Another expectation is that at least one woman should be represented, although this has not always been respected.

Appointments may also be linked to broader negotiations over other top EU positions, making the process even less transparent. In 2019, for instance, Christine Lagarde’s nomination as ECB President was agreed alongside Ursula von der Leyen’s nomination as President of the European Commission.

Once a political compromise emerges, the Council of the European Union formally recommends a candidate by qualified majority. The recommendation is then submitted to both the ECB and the European Parliament for consultation. The final decision rests with the EU's heads of state or government meeting in the European Council.

The European Parliament’s limited role

Although the European Parliament cannot block a nomination, it plays an important scrutiny role. It is the only stage of the process where elected representatives publicly question the candidate.

This scrutiny is conducted primarily by the Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). Candidates first respond to a written questionnaire covering their professional background and policy views. They then participate in a public hearing before the committee.

Following the hearing, ECON votes by secret ballot on whether to endorse the candidate. The full Parliament subsequently votes in plenary. In some cases, the committee has also interviewed multiple shortlisted candidates before the Council makes its recommendation, although these hearings have typically taken place behind closed doors.

While these procedures introduce a degree of accountability, the Parliament’s influence remains limited because the Council can ignore its preferences.

What happened this time around?

The appointment of the next ECB Vice-President followed this same pattern, with few surprises. Negotiations took place behind closed doors and resulted in a shortlist of six candidates -  all middle-aged men. 

Notably, the European Parliament had the opportunity to question them in closed-door hearings. The ECON Committee expressed two preferences: Latvia’s Martins Kazaks, supported by the conservative political group (EPP), and Portugal’s Mário Centeno, supported by the socialists and democrats (S&D). The Council, however, disregarded Parliament's preference and recommended Boris Vujcic instead. After responding to written questions and participating in a public hearing, he was approved by the European Parliament in plenary.

Vujcic is an experienced technocrat. An economist by training, he is currently serving his third six-year term as Governor of Croatia’s central bank and oversaw the country’s entry into the eurozone as its twentieth member.

If confirmed by the European Council on 20 March, he will become the first Executive Board member from a Central or Eastern European member state. This would represent an important step towards improving geographical representation and including smaller eurozone economies in the ECB’s leadership.

At the same time, his appointment does not significantly broaden the intellectual profile of the Board. Vujcic is generally considered a moderate monetary “hawk,” emphasizing price stability as the ECB’s primary objective. His cautious approach to expanding the ECB’s role, particularly regarding climate policy, reflects views that are already widespread within the institution.

A critical moment for ECB governance

The upcoming turnover in the ECB’s leadership creates a rare opportunity to reconsider how these appointments are made.

The current system concentrates decision-making power in closed negotiations among finance ministers and national leaders. Public debate is minimal, and the European Parliament, despite being the only directly elected EU institution, plays only a limited role.

Greater transparency and more democratic accountability are needed. Finance ministers should publicly explain their nominations and the criteria guiding their choices. The European Parliament, as the EU’s only directly elected institution, should also have a stronger voice in the process.

This debate matters because central banking itself is evolving. The ECB is operating in a context defined by multiple overlapping crises: persistent inflation risks, climate change, geopolitical tensions, and rising inequality.

How future Executive Board members interpret these challenges will shape the institution’s policies and its role in Europe’s economic governance and the energy transition. These issues call for open scrutiny and democratic debate.